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Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options – A Celebration of Bill Stuntz
(5/5/11)
Prepared for presentation at the Harvard Law School Conference celebrating Bill Stuntz – March
26-27, 2010. Please do not cite or quote from without permission.
By Daniel Richman∗
The unity of Bill Stuntz’s character -- his profound integrity -- makes it easy to move
from a celebration of his friendship (which I’ve treasured since we first met back in 1985) to one
of his scholarship, for creativity, wisdom, and humility are strengths not just of Bill himself but
of his work. [This opening depends upon the sequence of essays in the volume.] Even as his
broad brush strokes have fundamentally advanced our understanding of the interplay between
substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, and criminal justice institutions over time, Bill’s
work – like Bill himself – welcomes and endures sustained engagement.1 Humility is
appropriate for me too as I offer some ruminations sparked by his scholarship. The academic’s
plight is to simultaneously worry about being uninteresting and about being wrong. My hope is
to err on the side of error. And my methodology here will be much the same as it has been in a
lot of my other work: I seek to entertain Bill, and perhaps to bait him into telling me why I’m
wrong.
As Bill has noted, “criminal law’s breadth” – the sheer amount of conduct it subjects to
penal sanctions – “has long been the starting point for virtually all the scholarship” in the field.2
Back in 2001, he powerfully laid out the agency problems at the heart of the “pathologies” that
inappropriately expand the range and depth of American criminal law: “Legislators gain when
they write criminal statutes in ways that benefit prosecutors. Prosecutors gain from statutes that
enable them more easily to induce guilty pleas. Appellate courts lack the doctrinal tools to
combat those tendencies.”3 Thereafter, Bill elaborated his model, distinguishing between
∗

Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Alexandra Bowie, Adam Carlis, David
Garland, Niki Lacey, Maximo Langer, Jerry Lynch, Maren Messing, Bill Simon, Peter Strauss, Bill Stuntz, Carol
Steiker, Jim Whitman, and participants at two very helpful lunches with my colleagues and students at Columbia for
extremely helpful comments; to Carol, Mike Klarman and David Skeel for putting on this celebration, and to Bill
Stuntz for more than twenty-five years of friendship, inspiration, and humor.
1
See William J. Stuntz, Book Review: Christian Legal Theory, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1744 (2003) (“Imagine
how differently most law review articles would read if their authors admitted the possibility that they might be
mistaken.”); cf. Letter from Oliver Cromwell to the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland (Aug. 3, 1650), in The
Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell 3022-03 (Wilbur Cortez Abbott ed., 1939) ("I beseech you, in the bowels
of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken."). When speaking of Bill, I’ve not altered the present tense in
which this essay was written. Bill will always live in his written work, in the minds (including mine) that he
challenged to think harder, and in the people (including me) who loved him.
2
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 507 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Pathological Politics]; see also Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law
(Oxford 2008); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703 (2005); John Coffee, Does
“Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L.
Rev. 193 (1991); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 Am. Crim. L. Q. 17 (1968).
3
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 528.
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federal and local political dynamics,4 and explaining how the loss of local democratic control
over the criminal justice system has led to racial inequality in criminal justice outcomes.5
Bill has never suggested that these actors make their moves within a closed universe.
Indeed, voters’ willingness to reward just about any legislation that increases the scope or depth
of criminal law lies at the heart of his “pathology,”6 and he notes how “interest group pressure
only aggravates the tendency toward ever broader liability rules.”7 At the core of his diagnostic
story, however, is a narrative of how the institutional purposes of these actors are served by more
criminal law (and perhaps more criminal enforcement) than is appropriate for a well-functioning
society. I suspect Bill’s focus is quite right: More punitive and broader penal sanctions
certainly tend to increase the discretion of police officers and prosecutors and, under a
constitutional regime of largely unfettered bargaining, can be cashed out for search and seizure
authority, cheaper adjudications, agency prestige, political capital and the like. That these
transactions occur in a regime in which monitoring is particularly difficult makes them even
more attractive to enforcement actors, for whom increased criminalization can thus become an
unalloyed good.
Yet one might profitably supplement Bill’s insights into why institutional actors
oversupply criminal law by exploring another, more perverse, reason why Americans are all too
quick to resort to criminal statutes and actual prosecutions: Because criminal law offers a unique
and unnecessarily bundled set of institutional and procedural characteristics for which there are
no non-criminal substitutes, it frequently becomes a recourse – not a preferred choice -- when
more effective and durable alternatives just aren’t available. It’s troubling enough when a
society over-criminalizes (by some unspecified metric) and over-punishes (by some unspecified
metric). It is even more troubling when we use criminal law not necessarily because we
affirmatively want to but because it’s easier and cheaper than less punitive options.
To be sure, criminal law comes with some expensive appurtenances – also known as
“fundamental constitutional rights” – that tend to limit recourse to it. As Carol Steiker has so
insightfully explained, by raising “the cost to government of using the criminal process,” the
“revolution in criminal procedure” spearheaded by the Warren Court gave state and federal
legislators good reason to devise civil avenues for attacking “what might be more plausibly
classified as criminal conduct.”8 The chance to avoid adjudicative costs attributed to such
criminal procedure rights as that to trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt will give a
legislator or state official good reason to characterize a sanction or restraint as merely
4

See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of
Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2005).
5
William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969 (2008); see also William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of
American Criminal Justice (2011) (draft).
6
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at, 529-33.
7
Id. at 553.
8
Carol Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Geo.
L.J. 775, 780 (1997); see also Carol Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 771 (1998);
Daniel Richman, United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention, in Criminal Procedure
Stories (Carol Steiker, ed. 2006); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 Duke L.J. 1321 (2008).
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“regulatory” where all things are equal. Yet all things are rarely equal, particularly when
institutional context is considered. My goal here is to explore the powerful countervailing
forces that often make the criminal route more alluring – the forces that push legislators and
enforcers to use criminal law in lieu of other possible interventions, not those that lead them to
circumvent criminal protections by proceeding civilly. (In a semi-perfect world, these
countervailing forces would balance each other out. We don’t live in that world.)
In addition to honoring Bill by adding a few brush strokes to his wonderful picture, I want
to suggest that the solution to overcriminalization lies outside criminal law processes as well as
within them. The focus here will be to sketch out what moves in that direction would look
like.9 Insightful and provocative work by David Garland, John Simon, Jim Whitman and
others10 has quite properly focused on the cultural roots of our recourse to criminalization – and
highly punitive criminalization at that. Like Bill, however, I think institutional dynamics
(spurred by cultural preferences that are not necessarily related to punishment itself) have far
more explanatory power than is often appreciated.
The Institutional “Definition” of What Is “Really” Criminal
Had we an accepted metric for figuring out when conduct can properly be subjected to
criminal sanctions and to what degree, guarding against overcriminalization would be a lot easier.
Having one would perhaps not produce more reasoned decision making in our punishment of
core crimes – murders, rapes, robberies and the like – but it would at least anchor our decisions
about when criminal sanctions should be used as a tool of government power at border between
“mere” regulation an prosecution. Yet we lack any such metric. Markus Dubber has plausibly
suggested that the fault lies (at least in part) in the Anglo-American conflation of law and police
power.11 Picking up on this point, Niki Lacey has noted the contrast with our more discerning
cousins on the Continent, who worked hard to keep criminal law preoccupied with wrong-doing
and culpability and relied on regulation to advance other state goals like risk-creation or public
health.12 We made no effort in that regard and quietly allowed the police power to be
“absorbed” within “law.”13 The result is intellectual chaos. As Douglas Husak recently noted,
9

While the focus here is on the United States, the argument that overcriminalization here is partially a function of
peculiar doctrinal and institutional arrangements not found in, say, Europe, the approach may, in passing, offer some
comfort to Europeans scared that they are on verge of taking “the punitive turn” down the American or English path.
See Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies
(2008). But see David Downes, Contrasts in Toleration – 20 Years On (Dec. 2008 paper), available at
http://vsr.ruhosting.nl/page24/files/Downes-ContrastsinTolerance.doc (suggesting that countries like the Netherlands,
with “strongly social democratic political economies,” have not as yet taken the punitive turn).
10
For an excellent review essay, see James Q. Whitman, The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment, 1 Ann.
Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 17 (2005).
11
See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (2005).
12
Lacey, supra note 9, at 104 (on the Continent “this location of regulatory offenses within the framework of criminal
law ‘proper’ would be regarded as most unsatisfactory. Rather than drawing the old police power within the
modern framework of criminal justice, the modern governmental settlements of European codification of the early
nineteenth century were inclined to separate out this form of social regulation within a discrete framework, leaving
regulatory offenses as a more visible and autonomous manifestation of state power.”).
13
Lacey supra note 9, at 102.
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“The absence of a viable account of criminalization constitutes the single most glaring failure of
penal theory as it has developed on both sides of the Atlantic.”14
The scant attention Anglo-American legal development gave to drawing clear distinctions
between the province of criminal law and that of civil regulation was partly a function of our
general preference for procedural justice over a priori principles of substantive law. As Bill has
often noted, our Constitution has a lot to say about how criminal law should be enforced but little
about what criminal law should be. Our substantive criminal law therefore developed first
through the case-by-case pronouncements of common law judges and then by the varied
articulations of incensed legislators. The Model Penal Code eventually offered theoretical rigor
to receptive jurisdictions (a category that certainly does include the federal system).15 But even
in those states, the Model Penal Code has had only limited effect on the “special part” of the
penal code.16 To be sure, Continental systems – like those in Germany, France, and Italy -- will
occasionally criminalize what we leave to regulation or tort, as the French have done with
employment discrimination.17 And the coherence I see may just come from my distance and
ignorance. Yet one discerns an integrity in the substantive penal law of those countries that is
sorely absent here. Perhaps the same institutional self-confidence behind the commitment of
inquisitorial systems to seek the “real truth” in their courts also supports an effort to
systematically discern what really should be criminal.18 Here, we make it up as we go along.
Our tolerance for theoretically unrestricted criminal law and our readiness to rely on
criminal enforcement to advance a wide range of public policies is also a function of our
historically weak “state”19 and the paucity of our institutional structures, i.e. the lack of
regulatory actors other than cops, prosecutors and judges. From the Founding – and long before
in Britain20 – criminal justice institutions (however part-time) offered the promise of local
control (through juries, venue rules, and decentralized enforcers) and the capacity for accepting
14

Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law 58 (Oxford 2008).
See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 15 (2006) (when setting contours of the duress defense under federal
criminal law, Court gives “no weight” to the Model Penal Code formulation).
16
Gerard E. Lynch, Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 Buffalo
Crim. L. Rev. 297, 299 (1998) (noting that the “Model Penal Code is a significantly less potent guide to the ‘special
part’ of the criminal law today,” in part because “state legislatures have poured out new criminal statutes undreamed
of by [that Code’s] drafters.”)
17
See Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 1315 (2008); Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law:
Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 241 (2003).
18
See Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar
Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 Boston College Int’l and Comp, L. Rev, 317, 353, 357 (1995) (noting the
“[n]arrower scope of the criminal law,” in Germany as well as commitment of tribunal to “finding the truth”); see
also Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How the French Do It,
How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 568 (1990) (similarly noting narrower
scope of French criminal law).
19
For insightful counsel on how the term “state” should be used when referring to the United States in comparative
terms, see Desmond King & Robert C. Lieberman, Ironies of States Building: Comparative Perspective on the
American State, 61 World Politics 547 (2009).
20
See J.M. Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London 1660-1750 (2002); J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in
England, 1660-1800 (1986); P. King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England 1740-1820 (2000)
15
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new responsibilities on a discretionary basis.21 These characteristics made them the perfect
recourse for those who believed in minimal government, disdaining the interventionist Weberian
bureaucracies of some other Western polities,22 but who periodically desired a law for “just this
one bad thing” with an off-the-rack enforcement regime. Darryl Brown recounts: “The early
decades of the American republic continued earlier English and colonial practices of employing
criminal law routinely as a means of local regulation.”23 Thereafter, efforts to identify and target
vice in its many forms have played a remarkably large role in the growth of the criminal docket.
As Bill notes in his masterful upcoming book: “Between the late 1870s and 1933, American’s
criminal justice system fought a series of cultural battles in which criminal law – especially
federal criminal law – was a key weapon: against polygamy, against state lotteries.., against
prostitution, against opium-based drugs and, last, but definitely not least, against alcoholic
drink.”24 Yet vice is not the whole story. One also sees an easy creep from more mundane
regulation to criminalization in United States v. Grimaud,25 the watershed case upholding the
constitutionality of administrative crimes.26 It arose out of the 1908 federal criminal
prosecution of a California shepherd for violating the Interior Department’s national forest
grazing regulations. The 1897 legislation authorizing the Interior Department to promulgate
regulations to protect the lands under its stewardship had left it free to use either civil or criminal
sanctions.27 Thereafter, when the newly created Forest Service – led by the able Gifford
Pinchot, who carefully nurtured his ties to the Attorney General28 – assumed Interior’s
responsibilities and found civil injunctions inadequate, it simply prevailed on the Justice
Department to replead the regulatory violations in grand jury indictments.29 While the New
Deal and the growth of the administrative state brought a conspicuous proliferation of public
welfare offenses within the federal system, that proliferation thus had begun decades before. As
early as 1933 a canny observer like Francis Sayres could already worry about the upcoming flood
that threatened to erase what was left of the civil-criminal divide.30

21

Eric Monkkonen notes how the Boston sewer department was essentially spun out of the city marshal’s service in
1837. Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920, at 47 (2004 ed.) (noting how when Boston
incorporated in 1822, the city marshal was given general responsibility for matters affecting the “health, security, and
comfort of the city,” and that “[t]he only change in the power of the Boston marshal came in 1837, when the city
created a separate department of sewers, run by a former deputy marshal.”).
22
See Desmond King & Robert C. Lieberman, supra note 19, at 573-74 (“A well-rehearsed motif in American
political culture is that of being a strong nation with a weak state whose citizens prize decentralization and localism,
that is, a political system less centralized, less interventionist, and less Weberian than that found in comparable
advanced democracies, including some with strong federal systems such as Australia or Germany.”).
23
Darryl K. Brown, Yick Wo and the Constitutional Regulation of Criminal Law, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1405, 1407.
24
William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, 161? (2011) (draft).
25
220 U.S. 506 (1911).
26
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn T. Watts, Agency Rules with Force of Law, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 501-02
(2002) ("Grimaud thus established what Congress could do: it could delegate power to an agency to adopt
regulations subject to criminal penalties, provided that Congress itself legislated the penalties.").
27
See Logan Sawyer, Grazing, Grimaud, and Gifford Pinchot: How the Forest Service Overcame the Classical
Nondelegation Doctrine to Establish Administrative Crimes, 24 J. L. & Pol. 171, 184 (2008).
28
Id. at 193.
29
Id. at 184-202.
30
See Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 84 (1933) (“With respect to public
welfare offenses involving light penalties the abandonment of the classic requirement of mens rea is probably a
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Lacking any commonly accepted intellectual basis for distinguishing the appropriate
realm of criminal prosecutions from that of other government interventions, we ended up, by
default, with an institutional definition. Over time, criminal law in the United States became
what criminal justice actors did, nothing more.
Why Criminalization Will be Sought by Those Who Might Prefer Something Else
Conceptually, we thus have an inexhaustible supply of criminal law in the United States.
As a constitutional matter too, thanks to the Framer’s preoccupation with criminal procedure.
Although Bill has given us a provocative glimpse of “a kind of criminal substantive due process”
that would ensure that “the conduct criminalized was serious enough to justify some criminal
punishment,”31 this is not a doctrinal dog likely to bark in the foreseeable future (although every
so often, it gets up and walks around).32 As a result, the federal government and the States are
thus substantially free to impose the same stigma and sanctions on the violator of any social
policy that they impose on the robber, rapist, or murderer (with the exception of capital
punishment). And they can use the same cops, prosecutors, and courts to do so.
The supply of actual criminal enforcement is of course not inexhaustible. Cops and
prosecutors are expensive, as are prisons. (Particularly prisons, when you think about it.) Yet
these very limits, when combined with the strong norms of police and prosecutorial discretion
that characterize American criminal enforcement and the opacity that insulates prosecutorial
decision making from scrutiny,33 have ended up promoting the extension of criminal law’s
domain. Like those magic bags that seem to hold everything the magician puts in them without
getting bigger, criminal justice institutions seem able to assume any number of new assignments
without necessarily acting on them. Such is the value of decentralized and highly discretionary
authority. And because of our reliance on general jurisdiction criminal enforcement institutions,
the mere bringing of a criminal case entails a powerful statement of the condemned conduct’s
worthiness for criminal treatment.
That a single institution at each level of government should – with notable exceptions -have responsibility for all criminal prosecutions is something we take for granted, but shouldn’t.
Our readiness to extend criminal law beyond “core” harm-based concerns34 did not necessarily
(at least as an a priori matter) have to be accompanied by the assignment of these extended
criminal functions to the same general jurisdiction enforcement agencies that handle regular
crimes (murders, rapes, robberies, and the like). One could imagine a system of subject-specific
investigators bringing cases to “special” prosecutors housed in stand-alone agencies with limited
sound development. But courts should scrupulously avoid extending the doctrines applicable to public welfare
offenses to true crimes. To do so would sap the vitality of the criminal law.”).
31
William J. Stuntz, Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 66 (1997).
32
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); California v. Lambert, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
33
See James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. Legal Analysis 119
(2009).
34
See generally Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755 (2004) (discussing ways to
distinguish the "core" of criminal law from its "periphery"); see also Douglas Husak, 29 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 169,
171 (2009) (referring to "offences such as murder, rape, theft and the like" as the "core of the criminal law").
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missions. In such a world, specialized enforcement agencies could be equipped with
specialized investigative and enforcement tools keyed to their particular subject matter;
prosecutors could even bring cases in special courts. We have largely rejected or ignored that
model, however.35 Within the federal system, most prosecutions are brought by generalist U.S.
Attorneys. Even the Justice Department's specialized litigating divisions (like those for
Antitrust, Civil Rights and Tax) are housed within an agency that has general federal criminal
jurisdiction. Similarly, in the States, the vast majority of prosecutors are in general jurisdiction
district attorneys offices and bring cases before general jurisdiction criminal judges.36 Sure,
prosecutors within the larger offices sometimes specialize, sometimes in units that proclaim their
dedication to particular kinds of cases. And at the local level, some jurisdictions have
experimented with specialty drug, gun and domestic violence courts.37 Yet it is a fundamentally
generalist system. Moreover, everywhere, trials (to the extent they occur) will be before the
ultimate general jurisdiction players: lay jurors whose response to the evidence (and readiness
to convict) will be substantially driven by their views of the “seriousness” of the offense (or
offender).38
Consider how this institutional design affects the prosecution of offenses outside core
criminality: A fraud or “public welfare” offense will usually be pursued with resources (and by
prosecutors) that could just as easily be used against rapes, robberies, and murders, and by
prosecutors and enforcement personnel who may have just gone after such obviously “real”
crimes.39 And the reputational capital that an agency develops going after “real” crimes gets
deployed – consciously or not – across all the criminal cases it brings.40 No prosecutor would
be so stupid as to explicitly analogize a securities fraud or environmental crime to murder, rape,
or terrorism at a press conference, arraignment, or trial. Nor will anyone confuse Martha
Stewart with Matty “the Horse” Ianniello of the Genovese Family. But the announcement that
35

But see Luis A. Aguilar, Speech at North American Securities Administrators Ass’n’s Winder Enforcement
Conference, Empowering the Markets Watchdog to Effect Real Results, Jan. 10, 2009 (SEC commissioner argues
“that Congress could greatly enhance enforcement of the securities laws by authorizing the Commission to prosecute
criminal violations of the federal securities laws where the Department of Justice declines to bring an action.”),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch011009laa.htm
36
For a survey of the degree to which state attorneys general get involved in what otherwise would be local
prosecutions, see Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109
Mich. L. Rev. 519 (2010).
37
See generally Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to
Institutionalization, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1501 (2003); Phyllis Skloot Bamberger, Specialized Courts: Not a
Cure-All, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1091 (2003).
38
See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va. L.
Rev. 939, 971-73 (1997) (citing studies).
39
See Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, from The Law of Violence (forthcoming Oxford
University Press) “In the criminal law, violent crime seems to verify the need for, and justice of, the state’s own
violence in policing and punishment.”), available at www.law.berkeley.edu/img/Ristroph(1).pdf; see also James Q.
Whitman, The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment, 1 Ann. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 17, 29-30 (2005) (discussing
relationship between criminal punishment and social traditions of violence).
40
The same sort of cross-subsidy has historically supported extensions of federal criminal jurisdiction. See
Kathleen J. Frydl, Kidnapping and State Development in the United States, 20 Stud. in Am. Pol. Dev. 18, 20 (2006)
(“The quintessential crime against the person, kidnapping, furnished opportunity to those eager to project the formal
power of the state.”).
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an indictment has been issued in a securities fraud case is made from the same podium as an
announcement that a mob boss has been convicted. The police or federal agents will wear will
the same bedizened raid jackets as they cart boxes out of a hedge fund or counterfeit handbag
plant as they do at a hostage “situation” or murder scene. And all handcuffs look alike.41
In this world, the decisions prosecutors and other enforcers make and the actions they
take speak far more loudly than legislative criminalization. This difference in expressive
capacities arises for a number of reasons. For one thing, because criminal laws aren’t
self-executing, and we lack the German “principle of legality” that compels prosecution, a penal
provision may never have a life beyond the penal code. Yes, a legislator’s campaign literature
will tout her sponsorship of the “Get Tough on [Fill in the Blank] Act,” but that marginal
contribution to the thickness of the statute book likely has little more salience than a bridge
funded or defense contract obtained. It is often only after a prosecutor takes action that a statute
– particularly one drafted some years earlier – enters the public consciousness. Moreover, when
a prosecutor invokes a provision, she will always do so in the context of facts that she can select
for their moral appeal.42 This both enables the prosecutor to shape the contours of the doctrine
and ensures maximum pressure behind the expansion of the criminal law. In the end, though,
much of the power of the speech comes from the identity of the speaker: Although generalist
prosecutors may lack the specialized knowledge of their regulatory brethren across the
civil-criminal divide, they are far better placed to make trans-substantive claims of moral
blameworthiness.43 And since prosecutors have more “skin” in the game, because of the
opportunity costs of their cases, their claims of “criminality” have far more power to transform
social norms than the assertions of a legislature that has an infinite supply of such epithets.44
41

See Caaldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing civil claim of corrections
officers complaining about videotaped “perp walk” following their arrest for disability benefit fraud). The court
noted:
The "perp walk," that is, when an accused wrongdoer is led away in handcuffs by the police to
the courthouse, police station, or jail, has been featured in newspapers and newscasts for decades. The
normally camera-shy arrestees often pull coats over their heads, place their hands in front of their faces, or
otherwise attempt to obscure their identities. A recent surge in "executive perp walks" has featured accused
white collar criminals in designer suits and handcuffs. Whether the accused wrongdoer is wearing a
sweatshirt over his head or an Armani suit on his back, we suspect that perp walks are broadcast by
networks and reprinted in newspapers at least in part for their entertainment value. Yet, perp walks also
serve the more serious purpose of educating the public about law enforcement efforts. The image of the
accused being led away to contend with the justice system powerfully communicates government efforts to
thwart the criminal element, and it may deter others from attempting similar crimes.
Id. at 572-73.
42
See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 480 ("By paying close
attention to the facts of the cases they select as vehicles for novel statutory readings, federal prosecutors can
highlight the benefits and suppress the costs of the interpretations that they favor.").
43
See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. & Contemp. Probs. 23,
54 (1997) (“The EPA or SEC lawyer may be better able to compare each case with other violations of securities or
environmental laws, in terms of its importance to operating honest capital markets or protecting environmental
quality, but the prosecutor is better equipped to compare the violation with other types of crime in terms of the moral
blameworthiness of conduct, the degree of departure from general standards of citizenship, and the equity of
imposing stigmatizing punishment.”).
44
See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime 34 (2008) (“Unlike other agencies,
the bureaucracies charged with crime prevention are likely to enjoy a greater degree of political insulation and
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The unique expressive capabilities of those who actually bring cases can be misused. As
Bill has pointed out, prosecutors may have reasons for deploying the “criminal” label that have
little do with culpability or social harm and much to do with building institutional or political
capital. There may be short-term political gains – to the prosecutor personally or to her office –
from putting all sorts of temporary “public enemies” on the same moral plane as “other”
criminals. Moreover, the implicit or explicit claim that “crimes are crimes” can end up being a
bridge too far. Early in the New Deal – a time when criminal law was increasingly used as the
leading edge for federal regulatory regimes -- the A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation in
Brooklyn emerged as a serious threat to the National Recovery Administration’s program for the
notoriously corrupt kosher poultry business. Government inspectors found serial violations of
the Live Poultry Code’s wage and hour provisions, sales of unfit and uninspected poultry, and
they were themselves threatened with violence as they pursued these problems.45 The Justice
Department obtained an indictment against the four Schechter brothers and their firm on sixty
criminal counts, gained a conviction on nineteen counts, and an affirmance on appeal.46 When
the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice McReynolds got defense counsel to explain the
poultry’s code’s “straight killing” requirement – the seller was supposed to put his hand in the
coop and take the first chicken he touched – then commented “'And it was for that your client
was convicted?’” Counsel replied: “'Yes, and fined and given a jail sentence.’”47 The rest is
history.48
Still, the idea that a prosecutor’s office – not the courtroom or the criminal code49 – is the
place where discussions about what is “really” criminal runs deep. Particularly in the rarified
world of white collar enforcement that Kenneth Mann and Jerry Lynch have captured so
insightfully,50 the standard defense pitch starts by explaining how the alleged conduct, though
“technically” covered by a criminal provision does not rise to the level of a “real” crime.
Indeed, this tack is pursued to a fault.51
influence owing to the perceived sensitivity of their law enforcement missions and their ability to strategically
leverage responsibilities widely perceived as involving high social value.”).
45
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The thickness of the prosecutorial portfolio, the privileged status of certain of its
component parts (violent crime, treason, et al.), and the opacity of the criminal enforcement
regime can have material, as well as expressive, consequences. Consider the effects on
investigative or prosecutorial tactics. A standard story starts when some technique or tactic is
rolled out and authorized for an especially egregious offense – terrorism or child pornography,
for instance. Over time, the argument “isn’t [some other] offense just as bad” gains power,
particularly when accompanied by the assumption that enforcers will pick out only the really
“bad” instances of the new offense. Prosecutors or agents/police who move from one unit to
another will tout the virtues of the new tool, but word will get out even without personnel shifts
because of the common hierarchy and culture. Before long, the extraordinary tactic becomes
just another criminal enforcement tool. Outside the federal system, the vehicular stops that the
police make for felonies soon get made for misdemeanors.52 Within the federal system, USA
PATRIOT ACT subpoenas get used in cases having nothing to do with terrorism,53 and insider
trading cases get investigated with the sort of electronic surveillance previously reserved for
mobsters and drug traffickers.54 While none of these tactics is necessarily inappropriate on the
facts, the pooling of criminal cases without the slightest concern for proportionality can be
disconcerting. This is doubly true when the criminal law has expanded beyond into realms
traditionally enforced by civil law.
Showing a causal link is difficult, especially when one tries to connect constitutional
development to political change and bureaucratic choice. Yet I wonder whether the creep of
enforcement tactics from one offense to another not just mirrors, but is actually promoted by, the
“transsubstantive” state of criminal procedure doctrine that Bill has rightfully highlighted.55
That courts draw no “distinctions among crimes . . . when it comes to regulating criminal
investigations,”56 surely affects the calculus of enforcers deciding whether to import a tactic
from one area to another.
experience, it is not uncommon for defense counsel to seek non-criminal or deferred resolutions when, in view of the
charging precedent of the office, prosecutorial practice and the facts and circumstances of the case, such request is
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with offense gravity, the Atwater majority missed an opportunity to provide legislatures with an incentive to
undertake critical reexaminations of their criminal codes, a task that is long overdue”); see also Sameer Bajaj, Note:
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109 Colum. L. Rev. 309 (2009).
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Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2251 (2005) (explaining the increasing availability of
administrative subpoenas to criminal investigators).
54
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The ability of agencies that pursue “real” crime to attract and maintain funding and
resource commitments also has repercussions outside the core. Public safety is not exactly a
non-negotiable part of governmental budgets. Indeed, it has been interesting to watch state and
local governments cut back on their criminal justice expenditures in the wake of the recent
economic downturn.57 But support for general criminal enforcement agencies – local police and
prosecutors; the FBI and federal prosecutors – certainty has a durable strength that agencies
lacking their core crime portfolio can only envy. And the relative opacity of those agencies, the
high fixed cost of the informational networks (i.e. the local police patrol beat; the federal
relationships with local enforcers), and the apparently low marginal cost of extending beyond the
core crime mission means that even when funding for some government mission lags (perhaps
because of shifting political preferences), criminal prosecutors will remain potential actors.
Notice the two steps of the problem: Lacking any clear understanding of what ought to be
criminalized, we have opted for an institutional definition. This is not in of itself indefensible.
However intellectually unsatisfying this approach may be to moral retributivists or adherents to
Becker and Posner,58 there is something to be said for expanding the sanction curve and leaving
prosecutors to make the granular determinations not amenable to easy legislative specification:
while crack houses are usually targeted civilly, the owner of this particular one should face
criminal charges; while the SEC generally brings civil enforcement actions against insider traders,
this particular group should be prosecuted for criminal securities fraud. Yet in combination with
a second aspect of our system -- our reliance on relatively high-status general criminal
jurisdiction institutions – we end up with a dangerous political dynamic that makes criminal
enforcement the envy of anyone with a policy agenda -- even a policy agenda that, all things
being equal, they would have preferred to pursue with some other form of governmental action.
The intervention of agencies that, via legislative and theoretical abdication, we have placed in
charge of sorting for “real” criminality will thus often be sought less for features intrinsic to
criminalization than for those that have been bundled into criminal enforcement only
contingently.
The problem occurs at all levels of government and is not new. Decades ago, Sanford
Kadish bemoaned how the criminal process had become “overburdened” by the imposition on
prosecutors and police of the duty to provide various “social services to needy segments of the
community.”59 Although the obligation to pursue non-support complaints, he noted, “is
performed by police and prosecutors with some success, it is done reluctantly and usually less
effectively than by a civil agency especially designed to handle the service. In addition, it is
performed at a sacrifice to those primary functions of protecting the public against dangerous and
57
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threatening conduct which only the criminal law can perform.”60 As Kadish surely recognized,
however, any such civil agency would face vagaries of public funding and political support that
criminal justice agencies would never face. Perhaps the relative sanctity of criminal justice
expenditures (at least until the current recession) is endemic to California. Exploring how
California prosecutors have been using statutory rape charges as leverage for child support
payments, Kay Levine recently noted: “In an age where funding for social services is constantly
on the decline and law and order programs seem to be the only measures garnering bipartisan
support, criminal justice agencies may be the only institutions with the financial resources to take
on seemingly intractable social problems.”61 Yet Jonathan Simon (writing from California) has
plausibly suggested the phenomenon is national, reporting that “prosecutors operating mainly at
the local level have found themselves pulled to act in a wider sphere of governance that was
largely abandoned by the retreat of welfarism.”62
Not only will funding be stickier when a policy is pitched as a criminal enforcement
project but it will come with institutional and fiscal multipliers because of the priority that other
organizations, public and private, give to cooperation with crime-fighting institutions. Consider
Nancy Wolf’s account of mental health courts: “By invoking the court’s power and legitimacy
[and presumably that of the prosecutors bringing the cases], mental health courts may more
effectively jump queues or circumvent access barriers and, as such, be more successful in getting
mentally ill offenders into treatment.”63 Or consider the allure of “community prosecutors,”
whose status often allows them to leap bureaucratic boundaries and deploy (without themselves
providing) social services in the name of public safety.64
We see the same phenomenon on the federal side, particularly in the white collar area.
Even as the Bush Administration’s ambivalence about financial regulation led to diminished
numbers and zeal among front-line investigators at the Securities and Exchange Commission,65
federal prosecutors were racking up convictions in financial fraud prosecutions and the Justice
60
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Department was touting their successes.66 To be sure, prosecutors faced competing criminal
enforcement priorities67 and had to do some back-peddling in response to congressional
concerns about over-aggressive enforcement.68 But they were far more insulated from
deregulatory pressures than their SEC cousins. And anyone wanting more zealous public
enforcement in the capital markets during the Bush years (the lack of which we are now coming
to regret) would have reached for criminal sanctions far more than any rational sanction model
would dictate.69
Then there are the cheer-leaders for criminal enforcement that come from the ranks of
those who want less government intervention, not more. Take public corruption. The mantra
of opponents to campaign finance or lobbying reform – whether in Washington, D.C. or a state
capital – is that the bad behavior that reform proposals would target through prophylactic regimes
can simply be prosecuted, should actual instances occur.70 They drive the point home by
regularly passing overlapping criminal statutes that explicitly target the bad behavior. So too
with gun regulation, where the need for state and federal prosecutions of gun-toting felons has
been a key plank of anti-firearms regulation forces.71 Note how the best-case scenarios for a
regulatory regime can thus be picked off and assigned to the criminal process.
Criminalization – not just symbolic legislation but actual prosecutions – has thus become
a sweet spot for both those favoring maximal government action and those favoring minimal.
Rather than offering an extreme option in a graduated spectrum of sanctions and regulatory
66
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choices, criminal prosecution ends up as the natural point of first resort for all too many players
of this perverse political game. And the odds become slim that actual enforcement patterns –
the institutional choices that we rely on in lieu of serious thinking about the criminal/civil divide
– will reflect a serious engagement with overcriminalization concerns.
One can argue that criminal prosecutions are simply the gold standard for state action in
the United States, and that the centrality (and severity) of penal sanctions are just features of the
larger “culture of control” that David Garland has so insightfully explored.72 Yet, as Garland
himself has noted, we should attend to the structural and political sources that contribute to our
distinct culture.73 The (tentative) suggestion here is that the historically contingent institutional
arrangements highlighted above are more a cause than an effect of that culture (though they are
probably both). At the very least, we should recognize how our distinct institutional
mechanisms reinforce the social dynamics that social theorists have sketched out. And we
certainly ought to do so before making broad claims that American penal policy is “but the
pretext and springboard for a broader remaking of the perimeter and functions of the state.”74
Relieving the Demand
Just as consideration of how criminal law and its enforcement become a resort for those
for whom the stigma and punishment are but side-effects of an institutional preference makes the
pathologies of criminal law seem even worse than Bill has portrayed, so too might it offer new
avenues for relief. Bill has suggested that the overcriminalization problem could be solved
either by deregulating criminal procedure or by constitutionalizing the borders of criminal law.75
Perhaps there is another avenue, more true to our process-orientation: reducing the allure of
criminal law by providing institutional alternatives to prosecution, and giving those institutions
sufficient insulation from the ebb and flow of political preferences that they remain effective
alternatives even in the lean years.
Criminal enforcers (tautologically) have a monopoly over the state’s harshest coercive
sanctions. Against whom should this sanction be deployed? That question – extended to
include all instrumental uses of criminal sanctions, including information gathering – ought to be
at the heart of any discussion about what conduct should be criminalized and to what extent. If
we are not going to be systematic in having such a discussion, we might still – at least in theory
-- obtain a regime reflecting revealed societal preferences by relying on the choices made by
accountable enforcement agencies. When criminal sanctions are simply the second-best
preference of those who would prefer a regulatory, social services, or some other non-criminal
72
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regime, but can’t obtain it, that regime is unattainable, and overcriminalization – however
normatively measured – is bound to occur. That our harshest sanctions are used only because
less harsh alternatives are unavailable – that certain securities fraud cases are prosecuted because
public and private civil enforcement are underfunded or procedurally obstructed;76 that drug
treatment is more easily provided to addicts who are prosecuted than to those who simply seek
help – makes no sense at all. We therefore ought to try to reduce this overuse by addressing the
ways in which criminalization can crowd out and displace non-criminal processes and
institutions.
One key to such demand reduction lies in recognizing the features we have bundled
together with criminal sanctions that need not be exclusive to that regime. Sometimes
unbundling will be particularly hard because of the relationship that Bill has highlighted between
criminal defense rights and exercises of government power. Because criminal defendants have
speedy trial rights that civil parties lack, criminal cases will be on a fast adjudication track that
regulatory action can’t match. Criminal proceedings will also dominate where potential
informational sources can invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, since
the threat of prosecution (or the promise of immunity against prosecution) will be a powerful
information-forcing tool. Yet we could do a lot more to bridge the huge gap between civil
information-gathering mechanisms and the search warrants, grand jury subpoenae, and other such
tools currently available only to prosecutors.
I suspect, for example, that a truly independent ethics commission with adequate
resources and subpoena power would not be able, by itself, to clear up the self-dealing in Albany,
Springfield, or any other state capital in the intense competition for “most corrupt.”77 Because
the most troubling transactions are those about which participants are least likely to tell the truth,
even under oath, only the threat or reality of criminal prosecution and imprisonment will likely
shake this information loose. (Bill would probably have argued that anti-snitching norms are
now stronger in state capitals than in some Mafia families. But he could be harsh.) Yet
subpoena power and the manpower to analyze compelled disclosures might well make recourse
to the criminal law less necessary, particularly if given to an agency with the esprit and
professionalism to make use of them. While those who would starve regulatory agencies will
indeed get less regulation, they will likely end up with more criminal prosecutions as well, in
cases that might otherwise have been pursued without the threat of prison. The precise
distribution of cases in a institutionally richer system is of course uncertain: In the course of its
regulatory work, an effective ethics commission might kick up evidence of serious offenses
meriting prosecution – as a result of direct referral by the commission or otherwise – frequently
enough that we end up with more criminal cases than before. One can equally imagine fewer
criminal cases. The goal here should simply be to create a number of institutional half-way
houses – instead of a desert with criminal sanctions as the only shelter.78
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Consider the citizen seeking recourse for some “wrong,” perhaps done to him, perhaps to
others; perhaps one for which the law creates a private cause of action, perhaps not. Although
the line operator -- the jaded desk sergeant or eye-rolling agent – to whom she brings this
information may well do exactly nothing with it, a set of positive gatekeeping decisions by
criminal enforcers will trigger a cascade of publically funded actions that will likely impose
penal sanctions on the wrongdoer and, should he have any money, recompense for anyone
actually harmed (via restitution or facilitated civil recovery). How far would the citizen have to
look for non-criminal attention, and to what extent will the state subsidize that alternative process?
Obviously the answer to that question will vary greatly by context and jurisdiction. And in
some contexts, because of, say, the nature of the targeted conduct or the value in developing a
public norm, it might make sense to flatten out the landscape short of criminal sanctions, and
give the citizen fewer substitutes.79 In many others, however, it’s worth thinking more about
the gap between the satisfaction offered by a prosecution – if enforcers decide to pursue one –
and that offered by alternatives (which might be as simple as regulatory outreach). Against the
obvious net-widening risks whenever opportunities for recourse are increased (more litigation or
regulatory responses to more complaints), we should weigh the distorting effect that the absence
of such opportunities has on criminal enforcement.
We have similarly given too little attention to the development of efficient public
institutions charged with finding facts and inflicting stigma outside of the criminal justice
process. Because of defamation laws and the prohibitive cost of civil litigation, a person’s
criminal record is often the only source of public information about his past; it is certainly the
most frequently consulted.80 The private or public official who wants a record of someone’s
misdeeds maintained in the public domain will therefore often see criminal prosecution as the
only solution. Moreover, civil service or other employment protections can often make it far
easier (and cheaper for the employer) to have someone prosecuted than to terminate them with
cause.81 This is not to say that libel and employment law don’t have social benefits. The point
is simply that these and other institutional limitations of the civil process funnel close cases to
the criminal side.
Even public discourse has become impoverished. Consider how many discussions of
the morality of a public figure’s behavior soon degenerate into arguments about whether the
behavior constitutes a “crime,” with the implication that what’s not criminal is acceptable. Or
how often criminal procedure’s foundational “presumption of innocence” drives debates about a
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candidate or appointee’s qualifications.82 And because recourse to the criminal process leads to
the underdevelopment of the very noncriminal norms that would condemn behavior without
declaring it worthy of prosecution, the funnel widens over time.
Jonathan Simon suggests that the state has deployed the rubric of crime itself as a tool of
governance: “When we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of knowledge
historically associated with it – criminal law, popular crime narrative, and criminology –
available outside their limited original subject matter domains as powerful tools with which to
interpret and frame all forms of social action as a problem for governance.”83 Perhaps. Ours
is indeed a culture that has become all too quick to criminalize what we don’t like. But if we
decoupled certain criminal enforcement privileges from the criminal label we might substantially
reduce recourse to the criminal process, and to the sanctions and stigma that attend it.
As Bill has long noted, the degree to which we rely on criminal enforcers to sort out
conduct that is “really” criminal from that which isn’t challenges standard “rule of law” notions.
And judges and legislators ought to take on a lot more of this responsibility. But while we are
waiting for these reluctant actors, we should give more thought to the socio-legal vacuums that
criminal enforcers will rush in or be recruited to fill. Recognizing the degree to which diverse
institutional and political factors push toward overuse of the criminal process should push us to
design effective alternatives to it.
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